The Central Front D+19 (28 July, 1987) Part III

1300- President Reagan places a call to SACEUR and gives the American general the green light to prepare and launch the anticipated counter-offensive. He warns SACEUR that NATO forces are not to cross the Inner-German or Czech border under any circumstances unless Reagan orders otherwise. “Your mission is to push the Russians out of West …

The Central Front D+19 (28 July, 1987) Part II

Author’s Note: CENTAG is coming first because my laptop went south on Friday and it took over 36 hours to get it reset and all my files recovered. Need some extra time to gather my CENTAG and NORTHAG timelines and notes up from the wreckage. As a result, this entry will be short, unfortunately. 😊 …

The Central Front D+18 1830-2359 Zulu 27 July, 1987 Part II

The order to temporarily stop offensive operations took time to circulate. In some instances, units were in heavy contact when the halt order arrived. Without being given a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the order, unit commanders began to disentangle their forces from the enemy, pull them back, establish a hasty defense and then …

The Central Front D+18 1830-2359 Zulu 27 July, 1987 Part I

The new commander-in-chief of the Western TVD, General Boris Snetkov, received official word of the nuclear exchange five minutes before the destruction of both Novaya Zemlya and Gorky. This was essentially the extent of the news from Moscow. The absence of information left Snetkov’s head filled with a hopelessly long list of questions. Foremost was …

The Central Front D+17 (26 July, 1987) Part V Charlie

Late in the evening, General John Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) received word that the first troops from 1st Cavalry Division were over the Leine. The news invigorated SACEUR’s deputies, as well as his staff. After two and a half weeks spent playing round-the-clock defense, NATO had possession of the ball. NORTHAG’s new …

The Central Front D+17 (26 July, 1987) Part V Alpha

Disorientation continued to hamper Soviet commanders into the afternoon. From the divisional level straight up to the theater commander, there was no clear picture of the situation developing along the Leine or to its west. Fragments of information made their way to headquarters and then somehow ended up either being exaggerated and passed along or, …