The Southern Flank: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0400-0600**

Hostilities in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean began at 0400 CEST. The first clash between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces came in the southwest corner of the Black Sea off the Bulgarian coast. A combined force of Hellenic and Turkish navy fast attack craft was covering minelaying operations off Limankoy when they were attacked by …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 1200-2359 Part II**

CENTAG was an army group blessed with some inherent advantages. It's formations were made up of some of NATO’s best trained, and equipped divisions. The divisions making up the US V and VII Corps, as well as the West German II and III Corps, contained well-trained, and motivated officers, NCOs and soldiers. Their equipment was …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0800-1200**

Except for a small number of generals in Brussels and at Ramstein AB, as well as  a slightly larger cadre of pilots and squadron intelligence officers at RAF Alconbury,  no one in Western Europe had any idea about how effective the early morning F-117 strikes had been. Remarkable post-strike videos from the targeting pods on …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0545-0800**

The first wave of Soviet and Warsaw Pact aircraft launched against targets in West Germany, and the Low Countries was mainly consisted of anti-radiation missile-armed MiG-27 Floggers, and Su-17 Fitters weighed down with gravity bombs. Overhead, a regiment of MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters flew cover on the strike force. Fifty miles east of the border, offensive …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0130-0400 Part III**

0300– The first non-stealth NATO aircraft into East Germany that morning were USAF F-111F Aardvarks, and a mixed force of RAF and Luftwaffe Tornadoes. As the last GBU-27 impacted on the 20th Guards Army’s bunker complex at Mohlau, the fighter-bomber broke formation and scattered, heading for their assigned targets at altitudes of less than 100 feet. …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0130-0400 Part II**

The post-Vietnam years were a period of reassessment, and regeneration for the US Air Force. The service’s Vietnam experience was, and still is, comprehensively regarded as an example of how an air war should not be run. Restrictive rules of engagement, micromanagement, and a cumbersome,  ineffective process of changing tactics and strategy once it became …