Baltic Approaches D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part III

Predictably, security for the coming operation was airtight. So much so that the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) commander was not informed until late in the afternoon. A colonel from Marshal Ogarkov’s staff personally delivered the news. He’d boarded an Mi-17 helicopter and flew from Western TVD’s main command post at Legnica to the forward …

Baltic Approaches D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part II

Throughout the morning, and afternoon Soviet efforts to mislead and confuse NATO and the Swedes continued. Military deception has always been more of an artform than a doctrine for the Soviet military. The present goal was to sell the notion that an amphibious-airborne operation was aimed at Sweden, not Denmark. The constricted geography of Baltic …

Baltic Approaches D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part I

Western TVD’s commitment to a combined airborne-amphibious operation against the Denmark oscillated in the first eleven days of the war. The initial expectation had been for the operation to be launched in conjunction with the land thrust into Jutland from Schelswig-Holstein on the seventh or eighth day of the war, and only after air superiority, …

The North Atlantic D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part V

News of the Kirov’s demise reached SACLANT Headquarters in Norfolk first. An hour later it was followed by COMSUBLANT informing Admiral Baggett that USS New York City was now presumed lost. Her mission of trailing the Soviet surface group would now be taken up by either USS Augusta, or USS Jack. COMSUBLANT would make the …

The North Atlantic D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part IV

The plan Admiral Kapitanets devised was indeed a compromise of sorts. Instead of assigning an entire regiment of bombers to seek out and attack the American carrier group detected earlier by the Tu-95, Kapitanets ordered a smaller attack to be launched. Instead of twenty plus Tu-22 bombers, and a dozen support aircraft, the attack force …

The North Atlantic D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part III

Scott’s dispatch of the Tu-95 frayed nerves immeasurably and brought on questions that had no answers at present. Did its crew have enough time to transmit a radio message before its death? How many more reconnaissance aircraft and submarines were out there searching for the carrier force? News of the Eisenhower air wing’s attack against …

The North Atlantic D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part II

The last confirmed sighting of the Baku/Kirov group came at 2200 hours on D+11 from a British Nimrod, putting it 75 miles east of Bear Island and steaming southeast at eighteen knots. After transmitting the report, the British maritime patrol aircraft disappeared. When the information reached Strike Fleet Atlantic’s commander, he ordered two of the …

The North Atlantic D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part I

D+12 marks the start of a crucial, and decisive three-day period of the war in the Norwegian and Barents Seas, Baltic Approaches, and Germany. Before diving headfirst into these areas, I’m posting an order of battle for Strike Fleet Atlantic  as it stood at 000 on D+12. Given the significance of the carrier force’s contributions …

The Northern Flank D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part II

Heavy fighting and potentially decisive action would take place place to the north and south of Norway in the later hours of D+12 and into the next day. In the Barents Sea, Strike Fleet Atlantic was moving to kick the door to the Soviet’s backyard wide open, and in the Baltic Sea a major Soviet …

The Northern Flank D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part I

As the hours crept by and Colonel General Vladimir Arkhipov became more current with the overall situation in his new command, he found himself growing more perturbed. It was clear that his predecessor had been a blundering fool with not even a basic understanding of modern war. This lack of knowledge was responsible for the …