Baltic Approaches D+21 (30 July, 1987)

Early on D+21 the NATO counterattack on the North German Plain was underway. Unfortunately, allied land forces in the BALTAP region were nowhere near ready to commence offensive operations. Despite the best efforts of COMBALTAP and his ground commanders, the NATO brigades and divisions arrayed in Jutland appeared to need another twenty-four hours before their …

Baltic Approaches D+15 (24 July, 1987) Part II

Operations against the rebelling Polish Army divisions in Western Jutland had been scheduled to commence at 0200 hours. The failure of the expected East German regiments to arrive at the scheduled time, and massive traffic logjams on the roads in the Pact rear areas had forced Northern Group of Forces (NGF) to delay the start …

Baltic Approaches D+9 (18 July, 1987) Part II

The Northern Group of Forces (NGF) and Polish divisions pushing north through Schleswig-Holstein towards Jutland weren’t exempt from the indecision and ambivalence dominating the Baltic theater. The future remained unclear concerning the timetable for ground operations against Denmark. NGF’s commander, Colonel-General Ivan Korbutov wasn’t sure there would even be a next phase. Everything was contingent …

Baltic Approaches D+6 (15 July, 1987) Part III

The Northern Group of Forces divisions spent much of the seventh day of war recovering and replenishing. The heavy fighting endured over the past seventy-two hours had left Colonel General Korbutov’s divisions, and supporting units in a fragile state. The fighting on D+5 had been especially bad. It had all but shattered two of the …

Baltic Approaches D+5 (14 July, 1987) Part I

The naval picture in the Baltic at daybreak on D+5 was best described as a stalemate that neither side was willing to break for fear of  causing irreparable harm to their respective strategic positions in the Baltic region in the event of failure. The absence of a WP amphibious effort against Denmark thus far in …

Baltic Approaches D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part II

The Polish advance against the Jutland Division was on the verge of faltering completely by the late morning. The 12th Mechanized Division’s move to the front had been significantly delayed by a NATO air attack near Winnert. Combat elements of the 12th finally began to arrive and by mid-afternoon and the advance had picked up  …

Baltic Approaches D+3 (12 July, 1987) Part I

Colonel-General Ivan Korbutov was the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) commander. He had assumed command of operations in Schleswig-Holstein when the 2nd Guards Tank Army handed off operations in this sector to the NGF, and attached Polish forces. His command now consisted of the 6th Guards Motor Rifle Division (MRD) 20th Tank Division (TD) group …

Baltic Approaches: D+2 (11 July, 1987) Part I

D+2 presented a myriad of new problems for COMBALTAP, his battle staff, and commanders to contend with. Pre-war analyses, simulations, and exercises had largely predicted that the probable Warsaw Pact assault on Schleswig-Holstein, and Denmark would come from two directions: a land advance from the  East German border northwest into Schleswig-Holstein and ultimately onto the …

Baltic Approaches D+1 (10 July, 1987) Part I

The defense of Schleswig-Holstein was important to NATO’s defense of Denmark and the Baltic approaches. By noon on 10 July the issue was in doubt. The Warsaw Pact advance north to the Jutland peninsula was expected to resume within hours after slowing overnight and into the early morning hours. As the battle plan dictated, elements …