The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0130-0400 Part II**

The post-Vietnam years were a period of reassessment, and regeneration for the US Air Force. The service’s Vietnam experience was, and still is, comprehensively regarded as an example of how an air war should not be run. Restrictive rules of engagement, micromanagement, and a cumbersome,  ineffective process of changing tactics and strategy once it became …

Soviet Air Mobile Forces on the Eve of Battle: D-1 (8 July, 1987) **

  Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had sensible notions about what moves the other would presumably make in the opening hours of a conflict. Awareness is not enough to bring about the defeat or neutralization of those moves on the battlefield, however. Countermoves and defensive measures were created, worked into preexisting operational plans, and …

Airbase Angst: D-1 (8 July, 1987) **

Airbase commanders on both sides of the Iron Curtain breathed a collective sigh of relief as the sun rose in the eastern sky on the morning of 8 July, 1987. In NATO and Warsaw Pact air forces alike, the lessons of the Six Day War were well known. The preemptive airstrikes Israel launched against Egyptian …

Group Soviet Forces Germany D-3 (6 July, 1987) **

When the Commander-In-Chief of Group Soviet Forces Germany (GFSG) General Boris Vasilievich Snetkov told his aide that he was retiring to his quarters for six hours, he made it clear that he did not wish to be disturbed for any reason other than the start of war. The sixty-two year old army general had been …