Baltic Approaches: D+2 (11 July, 1987) Part II

LANDJUT’s next defensive line was established across the length of Schleswig-Holstein from Husum in the west to Brodersby on the Baltic. The Jutland Division anchored the western end of the line, and the West German 6th Panzergrenadier Division in the center. The eastern section was defended by West German Territorial units. Deployed north of the …

Baltic Approaches D+1 (10 July, 1987) Part III

COMBATLAP’s naval commander believed otherwise. Bornholm possessed no true strategic value for the Warsaw Pact. It was unable to support offensive operations against Denmark and the Baltic approaches. The island’s airport was small and its port facilities were severely limited for that. The attack on Bornholm was a feint, he judged, aimed at distracting his …

Baltic Approaches: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 1000-2359**

The Soviet air mobile assault earlier in the morning on Rendsburg nearly succeeded in decapitating LANDJUT’s senior leadership. The town, for all of its previously mentioned importance, also served as the peacetime headquarters for the Commander, Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDJUT). When warning of Soviet helicopters approaching Rendsburg was received, LANDJUT’s commander, a …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0130-0400 Part III**

0300– The first non-stealth NATO aircraft into East Germany that morning were USAF F-111F Aardvarks, and a mixed force of RAF and Luftwaffe Tornadoes. As the last GBU-27 impacted on the 20th Guards Army’s bunker complex at Mohlau, the fighter-bomber broke formation and scattered, heading for their assigned targets at altitudes of less than 100 feet. …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0130-0400 Part II**

The post-Vietnam years were a period of reassessment, and regeneration for the US Air Force. The service’s Vietnam experience was, and still is, comprehensively regarded as an example of how an air war should not be run. Restrictive rules of engagement, micromanagement, and a cumbersome,  ineffective process of changing tactics and strategy once it became …

Soviet Air Mobile Forces on the Eve of Battle: D-1 (8 July, 1987) **

  Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had sensible notions about what moves the other would presumably make in the opening hours of a conflict. Awareness is not enough to bring about the defeat or neutralization of those moves on the battlefield, however. Countermoves and defensive measures were created, worked into preexisting operational plans, and …