The Central Front: D+1 (10 July, 1987) Part III

*Author’s Note: I’m still playing around with presentation. I’ve been using the narrative approach almost exclusively, though on one or two occasions I’ve used a timeline type of format. I’m going to try the timeline again for this post in order to experiment a bit and see how it plays out.*   CENTAG 10 July, …

The Central Front: D+1 (10 July, 1987) Part II**

By 1700 hours Soviet forces had secured a firm bridgehead on the Elbe despite a counterattack by the Dutch 43rd Armored Infantry Brigade that left the issue in doubt for a period of time. In front of Luneburg, East German troops kept the Dutch forces there occupied well enough that 2nd GTA’s commander sensed an …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 1200-2359 Part II**

CENTAG was an army group blessed with some inherent advantages. It's formations were made up of some of NATO’s best trained, and equipped divisions. The divisions making up the US V and VII Corps, as well as the West German II and III Corps, contained well-trained, and motivated officers, NCOs and soldiers. Their equipment was …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0545-0800**

The first wave of Soviet and Warsaw Pact aircraft launched against targets in West Germany, and the Low Countries was mainly consisted of anti-radiation missile-armed MiG-27 Floggers, and Su-17 Fitters weighed down with gravity bombs. Overhead, a regiment of MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters flew cover on the strike force. Fifty miles east of the border, offensive …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0130-0400 Part III**

0300– The first non-stealth NATO aircraft into East Germany that morning were USAF F-111F Aardvarks, and a mixed force of RAF and Luftwaffe Tornadoes. As the last GBU-27 impacted on the 20th Guards Army’s bunker complex at Mohlau, the fighter-bomber broke formation and scattered, heading for their assigned targets at altitudes of less than 100 feet. …

The Central Front: D+0 (9 July, 1987) 0130-0400 Part II**

The post-Vietnam years were a period of reassessment, and regeneration for the US Air Force. The service’s Vietnam experience was, and still is, comprehensively regarded as an example of how an air war should not be run. Restrictive rules of engagement, micromanagement, and a cumbersome,  ineffective process of changing tactics and strategy once it became …