Baltic Approaches D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part III

The Soviet 4th Air Army intended to begin D+4  with a wave of pre-dawn airstrikes against Danish radar sites, and airbases. NATO’s unexpectedly heavy airstrikes against Warsaw Pact airbases overnight ended up severely disrupting the 4th’s battleplans. The damage inflicted on airfield facilities, runways, and aircraft was serious enough to delay the planned missions against …

Baltic Approaches D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part II

The Polish advance against the Jutland Division was on the verge of faltering completely by the late morning. The 12th Mechanized Division’s move to the front had been significantly delayed by a NATO air attack near Winnert. Combat elements of the 12th finally began to arrive and by mid-afternoon and the advance had picked up  …

Baltic Approaches D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part I

It was becoming clear to the Northern Group of Forces commander Colonel-General Ivan Korbutov that his superiors at Western TVD headquarters were increasingly regarding offensive operations against Denmark as a secondary matter. Defeating Denmark early in the war would’ve dealt NATO a major political defeat. On D+4, however, the value of a Danish surrender would …

Air War on the Central Front D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part III

While the defensive counterair effort in 2nd ATAF skies was rather porous, in the 4th ATAF region, DCA was formed an impenetrable wall. The Warsaw Pact air interdiction strikes launched against targets deep in the CENTAG rear areas were attritted heavily by NATO interceptors, and SAMs. Closer to the forward edge of the battle area, …

Air War on the Central Front D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part II

  Lieutenant General Goryaniov’s hunger for retribution was not satisfied by the morning airstrikes on RAF Tornado bases in 2nd ATAF’s area. The commander of the 16th Air Army wanted to strike a blow which would severely degrade NATO’s ability to defend the airspace above the battle front, or at the very least force the …

Air War on the Central Front D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part I

NATO’s surge in offensive counter air (OCA) sorties against Warsaw Pact airfields in East Germany, and Poland commenced in the late night hours of the previous night and ran through 0500 on D+4. Thanks in large part to the efforts of wing and squadron staff officers at RAF Lakenheath and other NATO airbases in the …

The Central Front D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part V

Offensive-itis was becoming endemic in the command ranks of NATO’s Central Army Group in the first half of D+4. The precipitous urge to put CENTAG on the offensive was infecting a large number of brigade, and division commanders, and corps staff officers around CENTAG. As the morning went on, their voices grew louder, and the …

The Central Front D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part IV

CENTAG Early in the afternoon on D+4 advance parties from the 1st Guards Tank Army went forward. 1st GTA’s commander, Lieutenant General Anatoli Tchernitsov was eager to gain a first-hand look at the battle his army group would be joining in a short time. As Tchernitsov sat down with his counterpart from 8th Guards Army, …

The Central Front D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part III

Warsaw Pact activity in NORTHAG’s southern area in the first half of the day was centered around a series of aggressive medium-sized probes and supporting attacks along the length of the Belgian, British, and West German lines.  3rd Shock Army had discovered, to its surprise, that NATO forces had fully withdrawn from Braunschweig during the …

The Central Front D+4 (13 July, 1987) Part II

NORTHAG D+4 opened on the North German Plain in much the same way the previous day ended. Warsaw Pact pressure on Dutch lines was constant although not heavy. Probing and limited attacks continued along the length of I NL Corp’s line. Dutch forces held firmly to their positions with little trouble as the morning progressed. …