The Central Front D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part IV

1330 The situation updates soared up the Soviet’s theater command and control network. At Group Soviet Forces Germany’s (GFSG) wartime command bunker in East Germany, General Snetkov reviewed the update and grew concerned. The Hameln attack’s timeline is precise. Delays and deviations now will only cause bigger problems. The general wants to push 3rd Shock …

The Central Front D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part III

*Author’s Note: I wasn’t intending for this entry to be short but work became an issue today. Unfortunately, this means Central Front D+12 will wrap up Sunday instead of Friday as I had planned. Sorry about that, guys.     0845 The initial reports of American armor to his division’s front did not surprise the …

The Central Front D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part II

By 0200 the 56th Guards Motor Rifle Division (MRD) was across the Leine and establishing a perimeter out to Highway 240. Behind it, the 58th Guards MRD began its own river crossing. NATO air attacks continued to disrupt the operation, damaging the crossing points and bringing on delays, but the movement of men, and equipment …

The Central Front D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part I

As the thirteenth day of World War III came to life, SACEUR sat in his office pouring over maps of the Federal Republic and reflected on the progress of the war in Germany. Thick red blotches denoted West German territory now held by the enemy, and red arrows of varying sizes showed the direction, and …

A Look Ahead to Late May & Early June

Good Evening, Everyone   As we come to what will undoubtedly be the strangest Memorial Day Weekend of our lifetime, I decided to take a few minutes to talk about what late May and early June will be bringing for World War III:1987. But first, I guess we should discuss the elephant in the room. …

Baltic Approaches D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part III

Predictably, security for the coming operation was airtight. So much so that the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) commander was not informed until late in the afternoon. A colonel from Marshal Ogarkov’s staff personally delivered the news. He’d boarded an Mi-17 helicopter and flew from Western TVD’s main command post at Legnica to the forward …

Baltic Approaches D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part II

Throughout the morning, and afternoon Soviet efforts to mislead and confuse NATO and the Swedes continued. Military deception has always been more of an artform than a doctrine for the Soviet military. The present goal was to sell the notion that an amphibious-airborne operation was aimed at Sweden, not Denmark. The constricted geography of Baltic …

Baltic Approaches D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part I

Western TVD’s commitment to a combined airborne-amphibious operation against the Denmark oscillated in the first eleven days of the war. The initial expectation had been for the operation to be launched in conjunction with the land thrust into Jutland from Schelswig-Holstein on the seventh or eighth day of the war, and only after air superiority, …

The North Atlantic D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part V

News of the Kirov’s demise reached SACLANT Headquarters in Norfolk first. An hour later it was followed by COMSUBLANT informing Admiral Baggett that USS New York City was now presumed lost. Her mission of trailing the Soviet surface group would now be taken up by either USS Augusta, or USS Jack. COMSUBLANT would make the …

The North Atlantic D+12 (21 July, 1987) Part IV

The plan Admiral Kapitanets devised was indeed a compromise of sorts. Instead of assigning an entire regiment of bombers to seek out and attack the American carrier group detected earlier by the Tu-95, Kapitanets ordered a smaller attack to be launched. Instead of twenty plus Tu-22 bombers, and a dozen support aircraft, the attack force …