We Were Right To Fear That Weapon D+24 (2 August 1987) 1648-2015 Zulu

1648– On Nightwatch President Reagan is placed in contact with Chebrikov and Dolgikh in the Lenin Hills. They speak for eighteen minutes. The topics discussed have never been confirmed by either the Russian or US governments. Nor have any of the three men involved ever revealed the matters discussed and agreements reached at this time. Historians have spent the last thirty-five years trying to solve the mystery without success. Yet it is clear that whatever was discussed paved the way for what was to come.

1654– The Joint Chiefs on board Nightwatch adjourn from the conference room as the conversation begins. That was a political matter best left to the politicians. Besides, there was work to do. From the communications center on board the command plane, as well as two other locations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued new orders and received status updates from multiple combatant commands. A greater number of SAC bombers and tankers were arriving at their positive control points. TACAMO aircraft were moving into position over the Atlantic and Pacific to communicate with the US Navy’s ballistic missile submarine force. Preparations continued on aircraft carriers and attack submarines as the race to prepare and position US nuclear assets continued on.

1711– In Moscow, Vladimir Dolgikh and Viktor Chebrikov were making their own preparations. Allies around Moscow, as well as outside of the city were contacted and given instructions. Rally points were established, and plans finalized. Marshal Akhromeyev was conducting his own necessary duties, contacting a host of commanders in multiple commands and TVDs. Voyska PVO was the main priority.  “You know, we could be shooting at each other in the streets next week,” Chebrikov pointed out to his co-conspirator. It was true. Despite the present situation, the KGB Chairman and Dolgikh came from considerably different political wings of the Party. “You might be correct Viktor Mikhailovich,” the progressive Dolgikh admitted somberly. “But if we fail tonight, then none of us will even be alive next week.”

1715– Reagan lays out the plan to his advisers and other senior members of the US government. His next call is to Great Britain and he briefs Prime Minister Thatcher on what is to come.

1723– Chebrikov contacts Romanov at the Kremlin and informs him that he and Dolgikh will surrender themselves and their supporters in person at the Kremlin at 1755 hours Zulu.

1730– Marshal Snetkov informs Marshal Akhromeyev that Western TVD nuclear capable forces are now under his full control.

1733– On Nightwatch, President Reagan once again goes through the authentication procedures and issues orders for the limited release of nuclear weapons in six minutes time.

1739– Three Pershing II missiles are fired within three seconds of each other from positions southeast of Hof, West Germany.

1746-Approximately seven minutes and thirty seconds later the first warhead explodes at ground level of its assigned target inside the Kremlin compound. In the next one hundred-twenty seconds the other two Pershing IIs hit their targets: Another point in the Kremlin compound and the KGB Headquarters building at Lubyanka, less than 2 km from the Kremlin. Payload on each of the three warheads was uniform: 0.3 kilotons.

1750– The low-yield detonations in the center of Moscow failed to trigger any of the alleged Dead-Hand systems which some experts feared Soviet leadership had in its possession. In any event, in the post-war years no evidence of a Dead-Hand system ever came about and the entire concept is now regarded as science-fiction.

1751– No communications or electronic transmissions were sent to the Strategic Rocket Forces or the ballistic missile submarines in the minutes before or after the detonation of the US warheads on the Kremlin and KGB headquarters. Chebrikov and Dolgikh’s men start moving into Moscow from three separate directions.

1815– The tension on board Nightwatch had become almost unbearable at the moment the Pershing IIs were launched. Satellites confirmed the successful impacts of the warheads at or near their intended targets. Following the detonations, Moscow went dark. No communications or contact with the opposition leaders or from Romanov. It remained unclear whether the decapitation strike was successful or not, but with every minute that went by without NORAD declaring a Missile Warning, hope grew.

1837– A radio transmission from Western TVD’s wartime headquarters to Brussels requests a meeting between SACEUR and Marshal Snetkov be arranged for 0600 the following morning.

2000– Vladimir Dolgikh and Viktor Chebrikov reach President Reagan onboard Nightwatch and inform the US leader that the Pershing II strikes were successful. No one has emerged from either the Kremlin grounds or Lubyanka. Damage was surprisingly limited, although the early estimate of deaths in and around the Kremlin is 9,000 and expected to climb. The Soviet leaders promise a situation update by 2200 Zulu. More time is needed before they can say with confidence that their hold on power is consolidated. Dolgikh tells Reagan that once the new Soviet government is in place, a ceasefire can go into place followed by more formal negotiations. Before signing off, Chebrikov compliments Reagan on his decision to select the Pershing II as the instrument of decapitation.  “We were right to fear that weapon like we did,” he concluded. “It performed far beyond our nightmares.”

Author’s Note: Much of D+24 is now over but there are still a handful of loose ends to tie up. The remainder can be tied up into a final narrative on Wednesday. As far as this section goes, a timeline was the only way to go. I simply did not have the time to do it all as a narrative. That would’ve taken a week at least. But as I mentioned earlier in August, I will double back to discuss some events from D+24 beginning after Labor Day weekend, as well as much more. In fact, with only a week left until my deadline date I’ll put together a schedule for posts through the next week and then I’ll do the same for the post-Labor Day week.