Cracks Widen: East Germany D+16 (25 July, 1987) Part I

Word of the Pelkwitz incident reached the halls of the East German government early in the evening of D+15. The initial arrival came in the form of an unsubstantiated rumor with scant details passed between junior-ranking officials at the MND (Ministry of National Defense). It wasn’t until an hour past midnight that the news eventually made its way to the State Security Service (SSD or Stasi). The MND had been given the gift of a head start. This factor would prove to be crucial to events which followed.

The news continued to spread even though solid information remained elusive. By now it was approaching midnight, a time when NATO warplanes were especially active over East Germany. Communications were normally unreliable in the period of time between midnight and dawn and today was no exception. The poor state of the GDRs national communications network, combined with the effectiveness of NATO jamming and other electronic weapons, essentially shut down telecommunications across the nation. While American, British, and West German bombs fell on airbases and railheads from Magdeburg to Cottbus, government sedans were screaming down the avenues of blacked out East Berlin and clandestine meetings were being held in various residences and offices.

Heinz Kessler, the GDRs Minister of Defense was the first government official to receive a full and accurate report on what had taken place at Pelkwitz. He wasted no time in devising a way to turn the situation to his advantage. He spent the first hour of D+16 preparing the battlefield, so to speak. Kessler wanted his pieces arrayed properly on the gameboard before approaching Erich Honecker, East Germany’s longtime leader. The minister dispatched trusted aides to brief select politburo and National Defense Council members.

Kessler also sent officers to a host of military installations outside of the city to confer with unit commanders, and their Soviet liaisons. The Soviet officers were taken aside and told that all GDR military units were in the process of being ordered to halt in place or return to their installations. No reason was given for the move. In reality, no such orders had been transmitted. There was no way for the Soviets to know this though, and by the time communications inevitably improve later in the morning, Kessler hoped to have valid orders to that effect sent out. 

Pelkwitz was a landmine. If the Stasi were allowed to get the jump on Kessler, they’d use it to discredit him, his ministry and gain more control over the government. He could not allow that scenario to become reality. Not when the GDR was embroiled in a war for its very survival. A war that had already cost the nation thousands of lives, both civilian and military. In these times it should men in uniform guiding government policy and decisions, not the glorified Gestapo that was the SSD. 

Author’s Note: Shorter post than usual, but I’ll make up for it later in the week. The next entry will be a continuation of internal events in East Germany on D+16, (Thursday) followed by a similar entry covering Poland (Friday or Saturday). Then next week I think we’ll be ready to dive into the Central Front D+16. Cannot wait! 😊 – Mike