Baltic Approaches D+15 (24 July, 1987) Part II

Operations against the rebelling Polish Army divisions in Western Jutland had been scheduled to commence at 0200 hours. The failure of the expected East German regiments to arrive at the scheduled time, and massive traffic logjams on the roads in the Pact rear areas had forced Northern Group of Forces (NGF) to delay the start of those operations. Tentatively, Colonel General Ivan Korbutov had set 1400 hours as the new start time, though he was uncertain the goal could realistically be met. As the morning dragged on, the general’s pessimism increased greatly.

According to Western TVD, three East German motor-rifle and tank regiments had been slated to arrive after midnight. The bulk of this force was still nowhere to be found. One regiment was presently moving through Schleswig-Holstein. If traffic foul ups and NATO airstrikes didn’t delay them further, Korbutov expected the regiment to arrive by nightfall. The problem was that a single regiment of East German motor-rifle troops did not possess enough firepower to break through NATO lines and reach the Soviet paratroopers at Skrydtrup. And at the moment, there were no indications of any other East German units heading north. The single motor rifle regiment was the only one in motion.

Until the East Germans arrived in larger numbers, NGF’s divisions were prevented from moving on the Poles in force. The 6^th Guards Motor Rifle Division remained positioned in the east, preparing to hand off to the East Germans. The division continued to conduct aggressive probes against the NATO defensive positions in front of them, searching for a weak point that their GDR replacements could potentially exploit. When its replacements did finally arrive, 6^th Guards would disengage, move west and hit the Polish forces spread out in the western area of southern Jutland. Simultaneously, NGF’s main attack would come from the southeast and be centered around the 20^th Tank Division, with army-level assets supporting.

At 1015 hours, Korbutov transmitted a status update to Western TVD’s headquarters in Poland. The report was acknowledged, and he was ordered to continue NGF’s preparations for the attack, as well as transmit updates every two hours. With that task complete, the general turned his attention back to planning the upcoming operation as best he could given the circumstances.

At the same time, the Polish 8^th Mechanized, and 16^th Armored divisions were digging in deeper in expectation of an eventual Soviet attack. Patrols by forward deployed units and battlefield reconnaissance provided by NATO made it clear their one-time ally was currently in the process of laying the groundwork for an attack. The commander of the 8^th Mechanized Division had taken overall command of Polish forces in Jutland and northern Schleswig-Holstein. Officers suspected of being, or known to be ardent supporters of the Soviet Union were removed from their commands and detained. Capable, anti-Soviet officers had replaced them.

The Polish divisions were operating under a cloud of uncertainty. Aside from the prospects of a Soviet attack in the coming hours, they had no clue about what was happening in their homeland. Communications links with military leaders and the government in Warsaw had broken down entirely. NATO was providing occasional updates from their own intelligence reports, but the information offered few answers and prompted more questions.

It was clear that something major was taking place back home, but the details remained unknown. Had the government imposed a crackdown on the populace? Or did the Jaruzelski regime turn on its Soviet masters? Those were the two most likely possibilities. Whichever one had come about, the commander of the 8^th Mechanized Division was convinced his actions on D+13 following the disastrous Polish airborne drop had provided the catalyst for what was now happening in Poland.