The Northern Flank D+15 (24 July, 1987) Part III

Through the morning and early afternoon, it was becoming clear the anticipated Soviet attack on Banak had been either delayed or cancelled altogether. The Royal Marines from 3^rd Commando Brigade who secured the airbase initially had been reinforced with additional troops from that brigade, along with US Marines from the 4^th Marine Amphibious Brigade. The NATO defenders extended their perimeter as far from the airbase as the present situation allowed as NATO airpower had struck the two Soviet regiments approaching Banak from the northeast. Earlier that morning, the lead regiment had stopped in place. Two hours later the other regiment followed suit. By 1300 reconnaissance flights showed elements of both regiments starting to move in the direction of the border. Banak’s defenders remained vigilant. More reinforcements were arriving and NATO airpower continued to strike the subunits of the 113^th Guards MRD as the movement northeast gained momentum. NATO intelligence, however, remained in the dark when it came to unraveling Soviet intent.

The 113^th Guard MRD had received a change in orders. What NATO was not aware of, and would not be for another twelve hours, was the substance of those orders and the importance they would have for the theater in the coming days. At 0900 a direct order for the 113^th Guards MRD to halt in place was transmitted from Northwestern TVD (NWTVD) headquarters. It was sent at the direction of the theater commander, Colonel General Vladimir Arkhipov. Ninety minutes later a second secure transmission was sent to the division halting the planned attack to recapture Banak and ordering its combat elements to reposition farther east towards the Soviet-Norwegian border. At Arkhipov’s directive, NWTVD was shifting the posture of its forces in Northern Norway from offensive to defensive. In effect, the general was ceding control of the air over most of Norway to NATO and establishing new defensive positions closer to the Soviet border. The news positions, he was hoping, could be more easily supported by ground attack aircraft based on the Kola Peninsula.

The Soviet land invasion of Norway was a victim of obsolete planning and inept execution, doomed from the start. Arkhipov realized it within 24 hours of assuming command. The writing had been on the wall for nearly three days now. If he had his way the withdrawal would’ve begun then. Unfortunately, in the socialist workers paradise that was the Soviet Union in July, 1987 even a theater commander cannot alter the battle plan without permission from Moscow. That it had taken so long for him  to receive approval was another issue entirely. The Ministry of Defense and General Staff were operating at speeds more appropriate for the Second World War. In the present global conflict, events moved at lightspeed. Political and military command structures had to keep pace, a reality Arkhipov didn’t think Moscow understood fully.

As it was now, approval was given. Now the process of pulling his motor rifle, tank and airmobile troops from the fire could commence.