The Politics of Global War: Dueling Dangers in Moscow D+14 (23 July, 1987) Part III

The hotline message arrived in Moscow a short time before the Defense Council meeting was set to begin. Romanov’s military aide retrieved the translated copy of the message and brought it directly to the general secretary, who was just then making the walk from his office to the conference room where the meeting was to be held.

GENERAL SECRETARY ROMANOV,

THIS MESSAGE IS TO INFORM YOU OF MEASURES TAKEN BY THE US GOVERNMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET UNION PUTTING ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES BASED IN SEVEREMORSK AND SURROUNDING PORTS TO SEA. THE US HAS SORTIED AN EQUAL NUMBER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES TO MAINTAIN AN EQUAL STRATEGIC POSTURE AS OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO. THE US WILL NOT SORTIE ANY ADDITIONAL SUBMARINES UNLESS AS A RESPONSE TO A FUTURE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET SSBNS FROM THEIR HOMEPORTS.

PROVOCATIVE MOVES BY EITHER SIDE AT THIS TIME CAN HAVE UNINTENDED, CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES. I URGE YOU TO REMEMBER THIS IN THE HOURS AND DAYS TO COME.

SINCERELY,

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

The content of the message surprised and confused the general secretary. He didn’t understand what the American president was talking about. While it was true that a limited number of Soviet SSBNs had left ports that were in potential danger of being attacked by American carrier aircraft, the majority of missile submarines remained in port.  The action had been explained to and acknowledged by the US government. So, what was this?

Predictably, the Defense Council meeting started off with Romanov informing the gathering that a message from Washington was received on the hotline. He then read the transcript aloud and demanded to know why the US believed that every Soviet ballistic missile submarine in the north was at sea. It was never determined if the general secretary’s question was answered truthfully that evening.

However, it has been established through interviews conducted post-war and by a limited trove of historical information along the lines of journal entries and transcripts from 23 July, 1987 that consequential decisions on the future conduct of the war were likely made in the meeting that ran from 2000 hours on 23 July through to 0300 hours the next morning. Events that took place in the following days also strongly support this contention. Yet there is no piece of historical evidence in existence which possesses the incontrovertible proof historians require to regard this as fact.

Conjecture and supposition dominate discussions on the 23-24 July Defense Council meeting now, as they have for the past thirty years. The war entered a critical stage after the meeting, unleashing actions and subsequent consequences that some parts of the world have yet to recover from, or presently come to terms with. Perhaps the best way to conclude D+14 (23 July) is with transcripts of the remaining hotline traffic between Washington and Moscow through midnight, Moscow time.

2145 HOURS

MR. PRESIDENT,

YOU TALK OF PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AND DESTABILIZATION AS YOUR AIRCRAFT DROP BOMBS ON SOVIET SOIL. YOUR HYPOCRISY IS ASTOUNDING. IF THE SITUATION WAS REVERSED AND IT WAS SOVIET WARPLANES ATTACKING TARGETS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO AMERICAN SUBMARINE PORTS YOU WOULD ALSO DISPATCH YOUR SEA-BASED STRATEGIC ASSETS TO SAFETY RATHER THEN RISK THEIR DESTRUCTION.

CONSIDER THIS, AND YOU WILL SEE OUR ACTIONS ARE NOT THE MARK OF AGGRESSION, BUT BORN FROM LOGICAL THINKING.

2230 HOURS

OUR ATTACKS HAVE BEEN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESTRICTED TO NON-STRATEGIC, STATIONARY TARGETS. THIS POLICY WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED UNLESS THE CONFLICT ESCALATES TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THE ACTIONS REGARDING YOUR NORTHERN-BASED SSBN FORCE. MY INITIAL MESSAGE WAS AN ADVISORY OF THAT, AND TO INFORM YOU OF MY DECISION TO MIRROR YOUR ACTION, BUT NOT EXTEND IT BEYOND THE PRECEDENT ALREADY ESTABLISHED.

2305 HOURS

THE UNITED STATES RUNS A TREMENDOUS RISK IF IT CONTINUES STRIKING TARGETS ON SOVIET TERRITORY WITH WEAPONS OF ANY TYPE. SOVIET FORCES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TOO. IF YOUR ATTACKS ON SOVIET TERRITORY CONTINUE, THIS OPTION WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED.

ALSO ON THAT SUBJECT, I FEEL IT NECESSARY TO WARN YOU THAT MY GOVERNMENT WILL REGARD ANY ATTACK BY YOUR AIR AND NAVAL FORCES ON SOVIET SSBN WARSHIPS AT SEA TO BE PRELUDE TO A NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

2330

THREATS AND INTIMIDATION ARE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE UNITED STATES AND HER ALLIES DID NOT START THIS WAR. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT RESTS FIRMLY ON YOUR SHOULDERS. BUT MAKE NO MISTAKE, IT IS THE SINCERE INTENT OF THE US GOVERNMENT TO BRING THIS WAR TO A SWIFT, ACCEPTABLE CONCLUSION.

I SUGGEST WE MAINTAIN CONTACT THROUGH THE HOTLINE REGULARLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, MR.SECRETARY.

2345

I AM IN AGREEMENT WITH YOUR LAST STATEMENT, MR.PRESIDENT.