The Central Front D+11 (20 July, 1987) Part III

It wasn’t until the late afternoon that 2^nd Squadron/3^rd Armored Cavalry Regiment was ejected off the first ridge overlooking the Leine and Alfeld. Their resistance had been strong, and resilient. It took far longer than anticipated to remove them, and the effort nearly bled 56^th Guards Motor Rifle Division white in the process. Shortly afterwards, the 1^st Squadron, positioned across the river from Brüggen, withdrew. Each movement was executed briskly, and in good order. The purpose for the US withdrawal had more to do with the units’ dwindling ammunition and fuel than Soviet pressure. Expenditures had been running extremely high.

No matter the reason, the fact was that the west bank was cleared and secure. 56^th Guards MRD could now expand the bridgeheads and begin to move west. Multiple pontoon bridges were operating at both towns and by 1700 the rest of the division was moving to their designated crossing points. NATO airpower, after a brief respite, came back with a vengeance, drawing the process out even more. Losses were heavy. Some of the recently laid bridges, or their replacements as the case was in some instances, lasted less than ten minutes before aircraft-delivered bombs, or cluster munitions permanently relocated them to the bottom of the river.

With the lifespan of the bridges now being measures in minutes traffic issues became more crucial. The delays, and snail-like movement of the rest of the 56^th Guards compounded the traffic issues on the roads leading to Alfeld, and Brüggen. Behind it, the lead elements of the 58^th Guards MRD were waiting in hastily established assembly areas, or strung out on roads targeted all too often by NATO aircraft. Soviet fighters were trying to maintain control of the airspace over the eastern side of the Leine, but had their own issues to deal with. (Author’s Note: This will be discussed in detail in the next Air War Central Front post.) SAM and mobile anti-aircraft guns caused heavy NATO air losses into the evening, but failed to stop the attacks totally.

At his wartime bunker in East Germany GSFG commander General Boris Snetkov monitored the reports from the front. As the news oscillated between satisfactory, and anxious so did his mood. On one hand, progress was being made. On the other, it was taking too damn long. Behind the two motor rifle divisions crowded around Alfeld, and Brüggen was the 47^th Guards Tank Division, still serving as 3^rd Shock Army’s OMG. 5^th Guards Tank Army was also moving towards the front. With all of this combat strength coming west it was doubly important for the Soviets to get as many units across the river now, expand the bridgehead and secure the crossings as soon as possible.

In Brussels, SACEUR read similar reports and comprehended the situation at the Leine. What he also saw, and what  NORTHAG’s commander had willfully ignored, was an opportunity presenting itself. Specifically, an opportunity to bottle the Soviets up even longer, disrupt their timeline, and create as much havoc as possible. Unfortunately, General Farndale appeared dead set against any maneuver or operation that threatened to take away from the defensive line he was putting in place at Hameln. Early in the afternoon, the British general had stiffly resisted moving two brigades forward to disrupt the Soviet crossing. He only relented after SACEUR’s insistence showed no signs of letting up.

Now, as those two brigades, one British and one American, moved east to relieve the 3^rd ACR, SACEUR found himself wondering once again if the time had come to replace the commander of his Northern Army Group.