Baltic Approaches D+8 (17 July, 1987) Part I

At 0400 hours on the morning of 17 July, 1987 Soviet ambassador to Sweden Boris Pankin requested an audience with Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson at 0500. The Swedes readily agreed to the request and the Soviet diplomat strode into the prime minister’s office at Rosenbad promptly at the prescribed time. He informed Carlsson that in forty-five minutes a Warsaw Pact military operation was going to begin against Bornholm in the Baltic Sea. Given the close proximity of Bornholm to southern Sweden, the Soviet Union wanted to inform Stockholm of the operation beforehand to give the government time for any Swedish air and naval forces in the area to be withdrawn. The Soviet Union, Pankin went on to explain, did not want there to be an unfortunate incident between Soviet and Swedish military forces seeing how the two countries were not at war. Carlsson thanked the ambassador for his candor and remarked that Sweden did not want to spark a conflict with the Soviet Union.

Pankin regarded the Swedish leader’s remark as an opportunity. Since the Soviet Union saw fit to inform Sweden of its intentions vis-à-vis Bornholm, Moscow would appreciate the same concerning Swedish military activity on and around the Aland Islands. “After all,” Pankin concluded. “Both our nations have treated the other with respect as this conflict plays out. For that to change now could be detrimental to all parties involved.”

The thinly veiled threat and its meaning was not lost on Carlsson. He was deeply disturbed by it, and by Pankin’s bluntness. Events of the past thirty-six hours had pushed Sweden into an unenviable position, the prime minister was just now realizing. The choices facing his government were boiling down to either do nothing and allow the Soviet Union to potentially conquer Norway, and Finland or oppose Moscow militarily, and conceivably join NATO. When Pankin left, Carlsson wasted no time in calling an emergency meeting of his cabinet and the nation’s military leaders. There were significant topics to discuss and time was at a premium.

 

As the talk between Carlsson and Pankin was underway in Stockholm, East German and Soviet ground-attack fighters launched a number of air attacks against Danish radar sites and airbases. The intent was to keep NATO’s attention off of Bornholm until it was too late to respond effectively. To make it appear even more convincing, the number of warplanes used was significant and the attacks were pressed home even in the face of determined NATO fighter and SAM defenses.

Shortly before 0600 the first wave of paratroopers from the 108^th Guards Airborne Regiment, 7^th Guards Airborne Division began landing on Bornholm. Advance parties, working with KGB operatives established drop zones south of the towns. As the airborne troops landed, they organized into companies and spread out to secure objectives in the southeast corner of the island. The most important one of these was Bornholm’s only airport, located just 3 kilometers from the main drop zone. The first Soviet troops arrived there at 0710 hours local time and by 0800 the airport and surrounding area had been entirely secured. No opposition was encountered there or anywhere else. Intelligence reports about all NATO military personnel leaving the island days earlier appeared to be correct.

By 0845 the first transports carrying the rest of the regiment’s troops and equipment were taking off from airbases in Poland bound for Bornholm. The division’s commander, Major General Vladimir Toporov wanted to have the entire 108^th Guards regiment on the ground by 1800 hours that evening. He was unsure if that schedule would be kept, however, his paratroopers were off to a good start.