SAC on the Eve of War: D-1 (8 July, 1987) **

In the final hours of peace on 8 July, 1987, the US Air Force’s Strategic Air Command found itself in a peculiar position. As the other major commands in the Air Force and in other service branches prepared for war, SAC was maintaining a low key, business-as-usual approach. It was strange development, but nevertheless true. Although diplomatic efforts had all but closed down by this time, a late afternoon discussion over the hotline between President Reagan and General Secretary Romanov had brought about an unexpected informal arrangement. The two leaders promised to keep the postures of their respective strategic forces untouched unless the alert level of the other superpower seemed to be changing. Whether by design or chance, Reagan, and his Soviet counterpart had come to a mutual agreement on the conduct of the war that was to come.

The Third World War would be fought conventionally.  But if NATO or the Warsaw Pact fared badly on the battlefield all bets were off. At the very least, Reagan and Romanov wanted  to keep the lid on the nuclear box for as long as possible.

These desires did little to assuage the nerves of SAC aircrews,  and missileers. The next time the klaxons went off it would be the real thing. CINC-SAC, General John Chain and his operations staff were keeping current with what was happening in Europe and simultaneously preparing the command for action. The Looking Glass airborne command post would remain up at all times, as always. The Soviets understood Looking Glass and its mission. Moscow would not see the move as escalatory. Alert facilities at SAC bases were becoming cramped quarters. Additional aircrews were moving in as the number of tankers and bombers on alert was increased. Maintenance teams were combing over Minuteman and Peacekeeper ICBMs almost constantly to ensure the missiles would be combat ready if the time came.

Not all SAC bombers would be kept at stateside bases on alert, though. Just as during Vietnam, conventionally-armed heavy bombers were going to be in high demand in this conflict. Some SAC squadrons had been assigned conventional roles in a time of war and were trained up to execute those missions if it became necessary. Two B-52 squadrons, one at Andersen AFB on Guam, and the other at Loring AFB in Maine were tasked to employ Harpoon anti-ship missiles against Soviet warships in the Pacific, and North Atlantic. Other -52 squadrons were slated to support ground forces in Europe. Although they were in high demand, Chain was reluctant to part with more strategic bombers than absolutely necessary. This hesitation brought on an intervention by the Joint Chiefs. General Larry Welch, the USAF Chief of Staff and Chain’s predecessor at SAC, told him bluntly over a secure phone line, “Goddammit, John! Quit being so stingy. We both know your command has more than enough bombers and missiles to wipe Russia off the map. You can afford to part with a few -52s. Using them in Europe against Russian tanks might help to stop us from having to use the rest of your force over Russia later on.” Shortly after the phone call, warning orders went out to the 2^nd Bomb Wing at Barksdale AFB to prepare additional planes for movement across the Atlantic.

For the rest of SAC, though, it was the same watch-and-wait game it had been for years. God willing, it would become nothing more.